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Abstract: This paper examines the evolution of regional innovation policy in Emilia-
Romagna, and Valencia, regions with similar economic features that implemented similar 
innovation policies in the 1970s and 1980s. We investigate whether their similarities 
have led to similar targets, policy tools and governance developments. We show that 
innovation policy in both regions suffered from the effects of privatization, budget 
constraints and changes to manufacturing during the 1990s and highlight the 
consequences. Although Emilia-Romagna experienced deeper change to its innovation 
policy, privatizations and/or the replacement of public funds promoted commercial 
approaches and induced market failures in both regions. The worst effects of these 
policies were the implementation of less risky innovation projects, the shift towards 
extra-regional projects and markets, and the favouring of large firms. 
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1 Introduction	
This paper examines the evolution of regional innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna, and 
Valencia, which have similar economic features and which implemented similar industry 
policies in the 1970s and 1980s. These policies were related to innovation and linked to 
the respective territories. The originality and positive consequences of these region’s 
industry policies has attracted research interest focusing especially on the role of the 
regional agencies ERVET (Emilia-Romagna) and IMPIVA (Valencia) as flagship 
organizations. In 1982, the 'Emilian model' (Brusco, 1982), was well known in research 
on design (Brusco, 1992) and implementation of industry policy aimed at small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME) (Brusco, 1989; Bellini, Giordani & Pasquini, 1990; 
Bianchi & Giordani, 1993; Bellini, Mohammad-Saïd &Négrier, 1996; Petrakos, 1996; 
Cowell, 2010; López-Estornell, Mas-Verdú & Molina-Morales, 2008), trade union 
participation in regional economic development (Sleigh, 1993) and evolution of the 
policy model (Cooke, 1996; Bellini & Pasquini 1998; Bianchi, 1998; Amin, 1999; 
Rinaldi, 2005; Bianchi & Sandrine, 2011). Several scholars have written about ERVET 
and other examples of regional development agencies in Italy, for example, Bianchi 
(1992), Bianchi & Pasquini (1998), Belussi (1999), Pietrobelli & Rabelloti (2002), Solari 
(2004) and Maccani & Samoggia (2010), as well as on real service centres (RSC), for 
example, Brusco (1992) and Bellini (1996).  
IMPIVA has been investigated by Ors (1994), Salom-Carrasco (1997), Ponce (2004) and 
Muñoz (2009) while its network of Technology Institutes (TI)2 has attracted the interest 
of other scholars (Esteve, Martínez-Serrano & Picazo, 2000; Albors-Garrigós, Segarra & 
Rincó-Díaz , 2010; García-Reche, 2003). The influence of AIJU, the Valencia’s TI 
                                                 
2 Technology Institutes in Valencia and real service centres in Emilia-Romagna offer advanced services 
mainly to SME. 
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related to toy firms is examined in Holmström (2006), the services provided by 
INESCOP to the shoe industry is investigated in Tomás, Contreras & Del Saz (2000), the 
contribution to environmental services in tile industry by the IT of ceramics (ITC) is 
explained by García-Reche & Picazo-Tadeo (2007) and the role played in textiles of 
Emilia-Romagna by CITER, a RSC  linked to ERVET, is analysed in Bianchi (1995), 
Bianchi & Bellini (1991, 1995) and Ligabue (1995), while García-Quevedo & Mas-
Verdú (2008) identify some economic variables that explain the use of the services 
provided by TI. Some authors study the relationship between use of TI and export 
activity (Mas-Verdú, Baviera-Puiga & Martínez-Gómez, 2008), the efficacy of 
knowledge-intensive services (Martínez-Gómez, Baviera-Puiga & Mas-Verdú, 2010) and 
the effect of the IMPIVA programmes on product quality (Moreno, 1993).  
In addition to work that focuses on either Emilia-Romagna or Valencia, there are some 
comparative studies. Emilia-Romagna is contrasted with Baden-Württemberg 
(Heindereich, 1996; Cooke & Morgan, 1994), and Denmark (Kristensen, 1992). IMPIVA 
has been compared with institutions in other regions and countries: see Barge-Gil & 
Modrego (2007) for a study of TI in several regions of Spain, Holmstrom (1999) for 
India, Montero (2001) for Brazil, and Samoilovich et al. (2005) for France and Holland, 
among others. Some studies compare the cases of Emilia-Romagna and Valencia based 
on their similar economic, demographic and policy features. For example, López-
Estornell (2007) develops an extensive face-to-face between both regions and Ansell 
(2000) highlights the existence of networking. Mas-Verdú (2007) includes the two 
regions in a comparison that includes other European regions, and Fernández de Lucio, 
Rojo & Castro (2003) analyses the characteristics of the two areas within a broader 
context.  
INGENIO (CSIC‐UPV) Working Paper Series 2012/10 
 5
This article provides a comparative analysis of one aspect common to these two cases 
which has not previously been investigated: the evolution over time of their regional 
innovation policies and whether the regions’ socioeconomics similarities have led to 
similar policy tool and governance trajectories. 
We look at the implementation of advanced technological services through the 
introduction of RSC in Emilia-Romagna and IT in Valencia, and their effect on SME. 
We discuss the consequences for policy and firms of the privatizations that occurred in 
the regions analysed during the 1990s. Comparison of these two cases highlights the 
conditions needed for persistence (Hughes, 1936) in the institutional arrangements 
related to new policy, which require adaptation to changing environments and sufficient 
stability to ensure transformation (Steinberg, 2012). Comparison of the cases of Valencia 
and Emilia-Romagna will identify some of the factors related to the dynamic 
development of innovation service policies.     
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research methodology. Section 
3 discusses similarities and differences between Emilia-Romagna and Valencia. Section 
4 examines innovation policies related to advanced technological services for SME in the 
two regions. Section 5 summarizes the changes to innovation policy strategies and the 
effects of the pressures related to the privatization of service provision in Valencia and 
Emilia-Romagna. Section 6 offers some conclusions. 
2 Research	methodology	
We chose a qualitative methodology. Information and data were collected using 
explorative methods. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 individuals 
who were in positions of responsibility in regional governments and research institutions 
or were representatives of important firm support organizations (see Annex for list of 
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interviewees). All interviews were conducted by a member of the research team. 
Interviewees were sent letters explaining the reasons for the research and topics that 
would be addressed in the interview. Interviewees were also able to expand on areas of 
the regional innovation policies.  
We also administered a survey, that included questions related to innovation and cluster 
policy, which was addressed to 40 academics and experts on regional policy and local 
development, who had participated in the Annual Meeting held in Artimino, (24-26 
September 2008) organized by the Research Institute Iris of Prato with the collaboration 
of University of Firenze. We achieved 15 completed surveys (almost 40% response rate).   
Secondary information and data were collected during the fieldwork period, from reports, 
documents, journals and the publications of private and public several institutions related 
to regional development and innovation policy in Valencia and Emilia-Romagna. 
Information was also collected from the publications of relevant support firm 
organizations in both regions. The region of Emilia Romagna has been studied in detail 
in the industrial district literature; the Valencian case has received less research attention 
and, therefore, is described in more detail here. 
3 Emilia‐Romagna	 and	 Valencia:	 Main	 similarities	 and	
differences	
In the 20th century Emilia-Romagna and Valencia experienced some profound changes, 
including the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy. In the first phases of 
the industrialization of these (and many other) regions, handicrafts were important. Both 
the regions analysed in this paper are specialized in traditional sectors including textiles 
and clothing, ceramics, furniture, footwear, and food products, although Emilia-Romagna 
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also manufactures a wide array of machinery. In both regions innovation is mainly based 
on low level presence of in-house R&D and intensive use of embodied technology. 
3.1 Some	general	features	of	the	two	regions	
Emilia-Romagna and Valencia are similar sized geographically, and have comparable 
population numbers (Table 1). Their respective economic nodes are along the Via Emilia 
and the Mediterranean Highway. Both regions are densely populated with their urban 
populations concentrated in the cities of Valencia (population 800,000) and Bologna 
(380,000). Per capita income is above the European average in Emilia Romagna, and 
slightly below it in Valencia.  
[Table 1 about here] 
3.2 Economic	similarities		
Valencia and Emilia Romagna have some similar economic features. For example, 
diversification of regional production, which has contributed to the achievement of 
balanced economies; highly export oriented manufacturing and agri-food industries; 
prevalence of SME – with especially intense development in the 1960s and 1970s; 
scarcity of state-owned enterprises; social recognition of entrepreneurial ventures; high 
density of firms (8.4 and 7 per 100 inhabitants in 2005 respectively); industry 
specialization above the national average; and predominantly traditional manufacturing 
sectors.  
In 2003, manufacturing and services accounted for 367,112 firms in Emilia-Romagna 
and 299,452 firms in Valencia (which is 82% of the Emilia Romagna total).3 There are 
                                                 
3 Italian and Spanish statistics are calculated slightly differently, therefore, these figures should be 
interpreted with some caution. 
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2,603 firms in Emilia-Romagna and 2,565 firms in Valencia with more than 50 
employees; the numbers of firms employing 10 to 49 workers is similar in the two 
regions as well.  
In both areas, manufacturing is organized mostly in clusters/industrial districts. Valencia 
has the highest number of manufacturing clusters in Spain (almost 50) (Boix & Galletto, 
2006a, 2006b), although many are very small in size. Its main areas of specialization are 
ceramic tiles (Castelló, Vila-real, Onda), furniture (Vinaròs, València), textiles and 
clothing (Alcoi, Ontinyent), and leather and footwear (Elx, Elda, Villena). Emilia-
Romagna hosts several industrial districts or local production systems (LPS). Its 
industrial district specialization is very similar to cluster specialization in Valencia and 
includes ceramics (Sassuolo), textiles and clothing (Carpi) and footwear (S. Mauro 
Pascoli, Fusignano). However, Emilia-Romagna is also a specialist producer of 
motorcycles (Bologna) and food processing (Parma) (ERVET, 2002). Finally, both 
regions host important trade fairs (Valencia and Bologna), which are important for 
SME’s export activities.  
3.3 Economic	and	political	differences		
The major difference between the two regions is that Italy has been a democracy since 
the end of World War II, but Spain’s democratic Constitution did not come to power 
until 1978. Also, Spain became a member of the European Common Market only in 
1986, an important but belated development for Valencia, whose regional economy relies 
heavily on exporting. Spanish industrialization under Franco’s regime was aligned to the 
establishment and support of large firms to achieve autarchy. National policy involved 
economic interventionism and trade protectionism both of which were damaging to 
export-oriented SME.  
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Both regions have high concentrations of manufacturing SME, but some of their sectoral 
features differ. Emilia-Romagna has traditional manufacturing sectors, many of which 
are located along the Via Emilia, and a specialized, diffused machinery sector, which 
drives innovation in the region.4 In Valencia, specialization is mainly in traditional 
manufacturing, although since the 1970s, plastics, metals, chemicals and packaging 
sectors have become established. However, in contrast to the situation in Emilia-
Romagna, there are no ‘push’ sectors similar to machinery, to impel innovation. On the 
other hand, the Italian region holds a greater concentration of manufacturing and 
knowledge intensive business services (KIBS), and a smaller presence of 
construction/building and tourism sectors. 
Valencia and Emilia-Romagna are both exporters: ratio of exports to regional added 
value was 31.4% for Emilia-Romagna in 2004 and 23.5% for Valencia in 2006. The 
comparative weakness of the Spanish region can be set against the effort invested in 
Emilia-Romagna to consolidate international distribution networks and to decentralize 
some phases of production.  
The dominant political party governing Emilia Romagna up to the 1990s was the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI).5 It was anti-large firms (Brusco & Pezzini, 1992), which it saw 
as a legacy of the fascist oligopolies. It was keen to forge strategic alliances with SME 
and to consider the big traditional companies as the common enemy. The PCI supported 
a competitive market as a means to stimulate SME growth and to reduce the market 
power of the large companies. This resulted in support for an industrial relations 
                                                 
4 Emilia-Romagna also hosts automobile, motorcycle and biomedical firms. 
5 Since the early 1990s regional government has been dominated by centre-left coalitions. 
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framework that favoured SME, and the implementation of policies designed to mitigate 
the financial and technological advantages of large firms.  
In Valencia, political leadership between 1983 and 1995 was with the Socialist Party 
(PSOE-PSPV), with regional governments predisposed to agreements with unions and 
employers and generally to creating a climate of collaboration to overcome the difficult 
economic situation provoked by the oil crisis and political transition. 
The powers of the two regional governments are different. The process of regionalization 
occurred first in Italy, but the level of responsibility and financial resources transferred 
by the Spanish government to the regions was higher in Spain. Regional public funding 
combined with EU and national funds enabled the development of strong industrial 
policy in Valencia. There is another difference that explains why the role of regional 
government is weaker in Emilia-Romagna, which is the strength of its local and 
provincial governments compared to those in the region of Valencia, where the regional 
government has experienced more support. Valencia has a smaller experience of infra-
regional government intervention in local economic development. Thus, industrial policy 
in Valencia had fewer reference points pre the process of devolution described in the 
Spanish Constitution and the Valencia Statute of Autonomy. 
By contrast, the lower budget of regional government in Emilia-Romagna stimulated the 
greater regional coordination of industrial policy with other policies such as formal 
education and, especially, vocational training. The tradition of the-job-training in firms 
contributed to this target, although it was also influenced by the need for more skilled 
workers in the machinery sector and in sectors of the economy that depended on their 
leadership in quality, design and brand. 
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Both regions also have different relationships with their respective central governments. 
In the case of Valencia, since 1983, it was only in 1995 and the period 2004 to 2011 that 
the parties in power were different, whereas in the case of Emilia-Romagna, from the 
introduction of its industrial policy in 1974, the politics of the national and regional 
governments have rarely coincided. 
At the institutional level, the Italian and Spanish employers' associations also show some 
differences: pluralism and competition in the former case and practical monopoly of 
representation of employers in the latter. As a result of competition, the degree of 
association and the force exerted by business associations in providing services to their 
members are also different and more intense in Emilia-Romagna. 
4 Innovation	 policy	 in	 Emilia‐Romagna	 and	 Valencia:	
implementation	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	
Innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia can be described as pioneering in the 
regional context of the southern European countries (see references Section 1). 
Innovation policy started in Emilia-Romagna in the second half of the 1970s and in 
Valencia in 1983. In the first phase (1975-1990), innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna 
prioritized SME and the establishment of RSC as government’s response to failures to 
provide specialized and innovative business services (Brusco &  Pezzini, 2008). The 
measures implemented represented political aims to support the position of the PCI, to 
develop alternative policies from those promoted by central government, which was 
controlled by the Christian Democrat Party, and to strengthen the weak regional 
institutions in a territory governed by powerful local authorities. In Valencia, the regional 
branch of the Socialist Party (PSPV-PSOE) was in power in 1983 to 1995. Its agenda 
included encouraging competition among manufacturing SME, which were experiencing 
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productivity problems and high rates of unemployment. Regional policy included 
diversification of the economy and the maintenance of good relationships with the few 
big companies located in the region. The policy emphasis was on the so-called real or 
productive economy as opposed to speculative firms.  
Industry policies in Valencia and Emilia-Romagna in the 1970s and 1980s implemented 
a wide range of tools, although in this paper we focus on a subset related to innovation. 
These policies gave support to individual firms outside of traditional industry policy 
which used to include award of grants, special rates for loans/investments and subsidies 
to reduce the cost of dismissing workers and focused sectoral policies. Instead, in the 
regions studied in this paper, the aim was to establish a new economic culture focused on 
firm innovation. 
The Emilia-Romagna government agency, ERVET,6 was set up in 1974 to manage the 
ERVET-system, which comprised six sectoral service centres and three horizontal 
centres. It also promoted or participated in a financial support organization and several 
local development agencies (see Table 2). ERVET had a majority stake in the RSC, 
which it coordinated and supported financially, with the remaining shares belonging to 
business associations, municipalities and chambers of commerce.  
[Table 2 about here] 
In 1982 the Statute of Autonomy for the Valencian Region was approved. A year later, 
the first regional elections resulted in a majority for the Socialist Party of Valencia 
(PSPV-PSOE). The president of the new regional government, in his inaugural address, 
announced the creation of a regional institute for SME. A team of economists in the 
research bureau of the Valencia Chamber of Commerce had previously produced several, 
                                                 
6 Emilia Romagna Valorizzazione Economica del Territorio (Economic Upgradings of Emilia Romagna’s 
Territory). 
INGENIO (CSIC‐UPV) Working Paper Series 2012/10 
 13
sectoral focused studies of the Valencian economy (Rico, 1982). They identified a lack of 
innovation in the regional industry, lack of technical staff, weakness of the advanced 
tertiary sector, and territorial concentration of several major low to medium-low 
technology manufacturing sectors. They identified the Valencian industry as at risk from 
competition with more technologically advanced firms in developed countries and 
companies in developing countries that could compete on lower production costs. 
The same team conducted analysis of industry policy in other European regions and 
countries, including Germany, the UK, the Nordic countries, the Basque Country and 
Italy, to highlight differences with the Valencian context. The situation in Valencia, thus, 
was not just a straight copying of the policy in place in Emilia-Romagna as some authors 
suggest (Cooke, 1996; Holmström, 2006). Nevertheless, Romano Prodi, a member of 
NOMISMA and founder of Rivista di Economia e Politica Industriale, in which he 
published several articles, had an intellectual influence. 
This research bureau team of economists proposed the creation of a regional agency for 
industrial policy, IMPIVA, to regional government, and helped to draft the Act that 
resulted in its establishment in 1984. The members of the team constituted IMPIVA’s 
first management directorate. The structural reasons behind the setting up of IMPIVA 
included the rapid technical evolution, the increased international competition on price, 
quality, diversity and design, and the competitive position of the Valencian economy 
between more advanced economies and low cost developing country firms. IMPIVA’s 
main objectives were to promote cooperation among companies, to increase the provision 
of advanced business services, to improve productivity, to facilitate the introduction of 
more advanced technologies and new product development in firms, and to foster the use 
of industrial design tools. 
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The agency's initial budget was only 200 million pesetas (about €1.4 million), which was 
an incentive the agency to search for additional sources of funding, such as the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), in which the Valencian Region was part of 
Objective 1. European funds and Spanish government funds became a mainstay of the 
agency’s budget which multiplied sixfold (up to 1,200 million pesetas or €14 million). 
The agency, in collaboration with business associations in various sectors, was 
responsible for 14 TI in the mid-nineties.7 Most of these were new TI8, managed by 
professionals who were independent of the regional administration. The TI were 
registered as research and technology associations. This type of cooperation allowed the 
incorporation of additional companies in the TI and enabled them to have control in their 
management. 
Some of the aims of Valencia TI were similar to the objectives of the Italian RSC: to 
supply innovative technology services to regional SME to compensate for their scarcity 
and lack of variety in the region. However, there are also some important differences 
related mainly to their strategic governance. The first RSC built on a successful training 
activity, and centres began to be established without any analysis of the specific needs of 
district firms (Brusco & Pezzini, 1992; 2008). The network of RSC in Emilia Romagna 
was based on general requirements, which explains the breadth of the services they 
offered which contrasts starkly to their scarce resources.9 This implies that theorizing the 
ERVET model occurred a posteriori  rather than being the result of planning, as it might 
be deduced from the work of some scholars (Bellini, 1990; Bellini, Giordani & Pasquini, 
                                                 
7 IMPIVA was responsible of the setting up of four Business Innovation Centres (BICs) and a technology 
park. We focus on TI since they are more similar to the Italian RSC.   
8 The initial TI network consisted of one institute related to shoes (INESCOP) and a few technology 
support units related to wood and furniture (Tecmade) and ceramics and tiles (Ceramics Technical 
Institute, University of Valencia). 
9 Available data show that, in the 1980s, 11 ERVET centres employed a total of 105 workers, i.e., an 
average of 10 per centre, which makes it unlikely that they were able to offer an effective service in an 
extensive industrial area such as Emilia-Romagna. 
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1990; Bianchi & Gualtieri, 1990; Leonardi & Nanetti, 1990; Mazzonis, 1996; Capecchi, 
1992; Cooke, 1996; Bellini & Pasquini, 1998).10  
On the other hand, the IMPIVA network of TI and their services were developed in line 
with a clear governance strategy and were managed by boards whose membership 
included firm representatives whose experience was gained through learning by doing. 
Operationalization of the IMPIVA network of TI was facilitated by dialogue with firms, 
close relationships with employers' associations and decentralized management. The 
process in each sector began with previous dialogue between IMPIVA and the presidents 
of sectoral employers’ associations. Once preliminary agreement was reached about the 
need for a particular sector, an association of innovative companies was established for 
each field, with the assistance of the IMPIVA. Although the management boards of these 
associations included two representatives of the agency, they were most led by 
representatives from the leading innovative companies in each sector. The associations 
and IMPIVA together elected the director of the sector TI, which helped to provide 
management continuity and accumulation of experience and absorption of corporate 
knowledge.  
The geographic agglomeration of firms in manufacturing clusters such as footwear, toys, 
ceramics, furniture and textiles resulted in the respective TI headquarters being located 
close to the cluster. Other TI provided business services to more distributed industries, 
such as metal-mechanical, plastic or food and beverages. A third group of TI responded 
to more general needs, through ‘horizontal’ centres such as optics and packaging. The 
                                                 
10 Belussi (2003: 246) suggests the impact of policies related to the provision of ‘real’ services has been 
exaggerated; he agrees with Brusco & Pezzini (2008) that intermediate institutions, such as service centres, 
have fulfilled a learning centre role for their members, but even in these cases the institutions were 
established without a clear agenda.  
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Valencian universities provided a fourth type after the transformation of academic units 
of research, with a substantial industrial effect (biomechanics, computation and energy), 
into TI  
 IMPIVA network of TI is considered a policy success because of the broad range and 
quality of the services provided and the collaboration with and within firms. This success 
was confirmed by firms through various opinion polls conducted by IMPIVA on users’ 
satisfaction. The indicators provided in Mas et al. (1990) demonstrate the success of the 
early implementation of the IMPIVA network: in 1990, the existing eight institutes 
(average age 4.3 years) in the network had 1,353 affiliates, and had produced 7,675 
laboratory analyses and 829 technical assessment services. The prestige of the TI has 
resulted in their representatives being used as expert advisers to the Spanish government. 
The success of the TI and IMPIVA is attributed to their modern management practices 
based on efficient administration and transparency. Important for the management of TI 
was the introduction of contracts and privacy agreements to increase trust in the 
relationships with industry. Policies related to the price of the services provided help to 
identify demand and adapt them accordingly. IMPIVA set specific goals for the TI, but 
favoured interaction rather than hierarchical management and relationship with TI. 
The economic relationship between IMPIVA and the TI initially depended on annual 
funding for the TI’s projects. IMPIVA evaluated the projects proposed based on 
objective criteria (e.g. number of associated companies, total volume of sales or human 
resources costs relative to total spend), to promote the most efficient use of staff. The 
agency took account of changes that required improvements to or expansion of specific 
services. Regular meetings with TI presidents and representatives and their presence on 
the Advisory Board of IMPIVA, up to 1995, enabled good relationships and mutual 
understanding of the possibilities and constraints that applied to both parties. The 
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relationships between companies and IMPIVA (and indirectly, also with the TI) were 
improved as a result of the implementation of regional programmes to support the 
development of technological innovation, the modernization of industrial equipment, and 
the promotion of design and fashion. For example, to encourage design efforts, a 
congress was held in 1985 which proposed scholarships for stays in main international 
academies and schools of design; IMPIVA also set up a design library and documentary 
unit at its headquarters, to improve relationships with and among designers; and several 
design units were set up in TI in line with IMPIVA’s decentralization strategy. This 
strategy is also evident in initiatives such as the setting up of independent technical units 
close to regional mini-clusters. 
5 Changes	to	innovation	policy	strategies	and	differential	
survival	 of	 public	 provision	 of	 innovation	 services	 in	
Emilia‐Romagna	and	Valencia.	
In the 1990s the innovation strategies in both the Spanish and Italian regions changed. In 
Emilia-Romagna, in the early 1990s and coinciding with the period of political change in 
regional institutions (1990), ERVET underwent thorough review and assessment of the 
public support it provided to firms and its supposed unfair competition for private firms 
belonging to sectors of technological and related services. This review was the result of 
lobbying by the employer’s associations attached to large firms (Rinaldi, 2005; 
Mazzonis, 1996), but also served the interests of other business associations. It was 
hoped that reducing ERVET’s influence would increase the spread of a ’free market’ and 
allow new services to be offered by associations of employers. This lobbying effort 
coincided with regional budget constraints and had consequences for some nodes in the 
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RSC network, which either disappeared or was forced to accept the reduced public 
financial support.11  
The reorientation of RSC was a result also of the large number of centres that had been 
established and their original rather ambitious goals, which were out of kilter with the 
available resources (see Table 2). Among the 11 IMPIVA TI for which data are 
available, in the 1990s, the number of employed staff was 420 researchers, engineers and 
support staff (Ors, 1994) compared to around 103 people in the RSC between 1988 and 
1995 (Bellini & Pasquini, 1998). Some ten years later (circa 2005), the respective figures 
were 1,328 and 221 (Maccani, 2007), highlighting the different expansion and 
implementation of ERVET and IMPIVA networks. At the same time, industrial 
production in the Italian region in 2005 was double that in Valencia. Under these 
conditions, the scarce resources of the RSC could hardly develop an effective policy. 
This profound change calls into question the robustness attributed to Emilian institutional 
model (Cooke & Morgan, 1998). 
The reform of ERVET passed by government in 1993 led to a reduction in its 
responsibilities and resources. The RSC made efforts to adapt to the new framework and 
new competition rules and offer its services to medium-sized and large regional 
companies and to firms located in other Italian regions. However, some of the provisions 
of the new regional law were not fulfilled, such as the functions attributed to ERVET for 
the creation of scientific and technological nodes, technology transfer and economic 
                                                 
11 Note that Brusco (1993) suggests that government intervention was limited to about 5 years and 
proposed the introduction of user fees to contribute to the self-financing of the RSC. There were also other 
reasons for the crisis in ERVET related to changes in the regional economy that occurred in the 1980s and 
the emergence of new business hierarchies that replaced the traditional SME in relation to their size and 
marketing and management skills (Bellini & Pasquini 1998). 
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profiting from research, functions that were assumed by ASTER (Agency for 
Technological Development of Emilia-Romagna), which had been created in 1985 and 
initially was part of ERVET. In 2003 there was a second reform that resulted in ERVET 
becoming a regional development agency responsible for (among other tasks) providing 
technical assistance to the region's infrastructure and attracting foreign investment, 
promoting cooperation with developing countries and developing collaborative activities 
with other European regions.  
In the early 1990s, Valencia suffered a major economic crisis. The victory of the 
conservative (Popular) party in the 1995 regional elections threatened the prevailing 
policy. Since the implementation in 1983 of the new innovation policy, the top regional 
representatives of the main Spanish employers’ association were opposed to IMPIVA, 
considering it interventionist, elitist and not focused on the problems being experienced 
by firms.12 They advocated for a more traditional industry policy incorporating grants, 
subsidies and low borrowing rates to encourage business investment, and other initiatives 
not linked to a specific innovation strategy. It could be argued that employers were trying 
to maintain a monopoly on the relationships between government and firms, which they 
saw as being threatened by firms having ties to regional government through TI.     
However, the TI were intended to be governed by ad-hoc associations of firms interested 
in new services to facilitate innovation activities, and IMPIVA funded part of the 
investment needed for these activities through a combined bottom-up/ top-down/ process. 
The model of governance in 1995 supported a wide ranging relationship between firms’ 
                                                 
12 Some initial opponents subsequently admitted to misunderstanding the rationale for this regional 
government policy: the terms technological innovation, product differentiation, design, trademark, quality 
and internationalization were ‘too’ new for many firms. 
 
INGENIO (CSIC‐UPV) Working Paper Series 2012/10 
 20
sectoral associations and the TI. Some of these associations were able to buffer the 
activities of the conservative government and the higher representatives of the 
employers’ association. It became clear that the network of TI would survive only with 
the support of the regional agency, otherwise it would sink because the employers’ 
sectoral associations were not sufficiently strong to sustain it. As result, the new regional 
government decided to reduce only partially economic support to the TI but making 
future funding uncertain and promoting self-financing.  
The bottom-up approach of the IMPIVA network of TI, which was a conscious strategy, 
enabled the network to resist some of the pressure to abandon the former innovation 
policy, resulting in a decoupling of industry policy from an ideological position that was 
likely to damage cooperation among IMPIVA, firms and the TI. This explains the lower 
levels of privatization and self-financing in Valencia than in Emilia-Romagna. On the 
other hand, Emilia-Romagna developed a strong mechanical sector that requires high 
levels of technological expertise, which has encouraged the development of advanced 
services in private firms while the technology requirement for Valencia’s manufacturing 
sectors and specialization of advanced services, like those intensive in knowledge, is 
much lower, supporting continuity of the TI. 
Finally, we discuss the consequences of policy changes in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia 
and the effects of a shift towards more self-financing of the RSC and TI after the crisis in 
the mid-1990s. First, both organizations began to force closer relationships with large 
companies. This was not a retrograde step because it can lead to the acquisition of new 
expertise; however, it is counterproductive if it increases the likelihood of smaller firms 
being excluded due to the higher transaction costs involved in providing innovative and 
non-standardized services. Second, the TI service centres began to focus on low risk 
projects, a strategy that had three major consequences. First, an emphasis on projects 
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funded by European programmes, which were low risk, provided the possibility of more 
certain finance in the long term, and opportunities for international relationships and 
contacts with new sources of knowledge. Second, it became more difficult to develop 
collaborative regional projects involving several centres, which required long term 
commitment or investment in new infrastructure, because of the higher risks and higher 
implementation and transaction costs. Third, the scarce provision of new, specialised and 
risky new services because, also according to the new criterion, they have not demand 
enough to justify their implementation, confronted with well-known and standardized  
services, more efficient from this point of view (Bellini 2002). 
In IMPIVA’s case, there was a loss of ‘freshness’ in the relationships among network 
nodes. Even moderation of regional-government positions after an initial hostile 
reception, did not prevent some loss of IMPIVA’s leadership. An indirect example is the 
creation by the TI of a lobby to defend their positions before IMPIVA and Spanish public 
administration. 
6 Conclusions	
The paper contrasted innovation policy in Emilia-Romagna and Valencia. Both regions 
have several similar economic and demographic features, including their industrialization 
processes, high proportion of SME, specialization in traditional manufacturing, 
concentration of firms in industrial districts and export activity.  
They both introduced innovative policy tools targeting SME, such as RSC (Emilia-
Romagna) and TI (Valencia) in an attempt to overcome the barriers to providing 
advanced technological services to these firms. However, implementation and policy 
development followed different paths and were of different intensity due to the 
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differences between the institutional and governance models of these regions and 
resulting greater strength of Valencia’s policy. 
In the 1990s, both regional governments revised their policies with the aim of reducing 
the public interventionism. The result was higher levels of privatization and self-
financing in Emilia-Romagna than in Valencia. In the Italian region, the absence of an 
initial and persistent strategy, the presence of different employers’ associations with their 
own networks of firm services, the development of a private sector for advanced services, 
regional budget constraints, the small size of most RSC and the political changes since 
1989 exerted strong pressure against regional policy. The result was an abrupt switch 
towards privatization of the services previously offered by ERVET and deep 
transformation of this agency. 
In Valencia, the conscious choice of bottom-up governance supported a closer 
relationship between IMPIVA and firms’ sectoral associations and innovative SME, 
which favoured the survival of the TI even in the difficult economic and political 
conditions of mid 1990s. Also, features of IMPIVA’s original policies had an impact, for 
example, the holistic conception of its programmes, which allowed for synergies between 
TI and companies, and territorial decentralization of its innovation policies. There were 
also factors such as appropriate budget, small development of private firms in the field of 
knowledge services and the scale economies achieved by TI. All this aspects contributed 
to strengthening policy which helped SME and created a new and positive image of 
regional industry. However, the reduction in public funding had some negative 
consequences for the SME in both regions by encouraging lower risk service provision, 
priority being given to large companies’ needs, and extra-regional projects designed to 
ensure continuity of the TI and RSC.  
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An industry innovation policy for SME, that is strong enough to survive the turmoil of 
political and economic changes needs an appropriate level of public governance that is 
not overly bureaucratic and is oriented to cognitive and territorial proximity to the policy 
recipients. This does not imply inertia or suggest that there is no need for evaluations and 
modifications to policy. Current problems are different from those in the 1980s and 
1990s and policy must be adapted to reflect the new challenges. At the same time, policy 
takes time to achieve its objectives (Steinberg, 2012). We believe this comparative study 
of the Emilia-Romagna and Valencian cases provides some interesting lessons for 
scholars and policy makers keen to understand and achieve this subtle equilibrium 
between institutional continuity and adaptation to change. 
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Tables	
 
Table 1 Statistics for Emilia-Romagna and Valencia 
  
Emilia-
Romagn
a Valencia 
Regional capital Bologna Valencia 
Surface (km2) 22,125 23,254 
Population (2005, ER; 2006, V) 4,187,557 4,806,908 
Regional population as % of national 
population  7.1 10.8 
Population density (no. of inhabitants/km2) 191 207 
Number of  municipalities 341 542 
Population: main regional city  380,000 934,000 
Population: main regional city + metropolitan 
area 934,000 1,500,000 
Population of other main cities (*) 98,400-170,000 172,000-322,000 
Number of provinces 9 3 
Main regional transport axis Via Emilia 
Mediterranean 
Highway 
Coastline (km approx.) 100 500 
Per capita GDP (European Union=100) in 
PPP, 2004 130 94 
(*)172,000- 541,000 if the urban area Alicante-Elche is considered 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Table 2 ERVET  and  IMPIVA systems 
Centre Sector/activity 
Setting 
up year 
% ERVET 
participation (1995) 
Employees 
(1) 
Employees c. 
2005 
Currently part of 
ERVET network Centre Sector/activity 
Setting 
up year 
Employees c. 
1991 
Employees c. 
2006 
Currently part of 
IMPIVA 
network 
Sectoral Services Centres or IT 
CITER Textile 1980 25 19* 12 X INESCOP (1) Footwear 1984 76 118 X 
CESMA Agrarian Machinery 1983 40 4* 3   AICE (2) Ceramics 1984 56 129 X 
CERCAL Footwear 1983 46,7 6* 5   AIDIMA  (3) Furniture 1984 35 111 X 
QUASCO Building 1985 44,1 11* 17 X AITEX  Textile 1985 35 99 X 
Centro Ceramico Ceramics 1976 na 31** 38   AIJU  Toys 1985 29 59 X 
CEMOTER 
Land-transporting 
Machinery 1982 na 13**     AIMME  Metal-Mechanics 1987 72 87 X 
              AINIA  Food 1987 43 163 X 
              AIDICO  Building 1990 10 99 X 
              AIMPLAS  Plastics 1990 10 71 X 
              ALICER  (***) Ceramics design 1993 na na X 
Horizontal Services Centres or IT 
ASTER Technological Development 1985 64 11** 30   IBV (4) Biomechanics 1986 38 137 X 
CERMET Metal-Mechanics 1985 32,2 8** 90 X ITENE  Packaging 1993 na 73 X 
DEMOCENTER Industrial Automatization 1991 29,2   26   ITI (4) ITC 1994 na 47 X 
              ITE (4) Energy 1994 na 62 X 
              AIDO (4) Optics 1986 16 73 X 
Financial Services             
FIT 
Financiation for 
Technological Development   75,3                   
In 1995 are no longer linked to ERVET: SVEX (export promotion), ASE (local development agency in Ravenna), PROMORESTAURO (promotion of historical and artistic heritage in Bologna), Rosalind (industrial promotion in Piacenza), IDROSER (water resources for 
development of the region), CETAS (training of experts in food and agriculture in developing countries), SPOT (Promotion and transfer of services to improve the metal-mechanic industry) and RESFOR (outsourcing of machinery)  
 
(*) In 1995 (**) In 1988   *** Merged AICE  (1) Established in 1971 as a firm cooperative, in 1978 became a research association (2) Spin-off from the Technical Chemistry Institute of Valencia University (3) On the basis of a technical unit of the Wood Employer’s Association; 
(4) In collaboration with the Polytechnic University of Valencia. n.a.: no available 
Source:  IMPIVA, Laboratorio di Politica Industriale, Nomisma, Bolonia. Quoted in Bellini (1990). ERVET (2002); Bellini & Pasquini (1998); Cooke & Morgan 1994); Bellini, Giordini & Pasquini (1990); Maccani,  (2007) and own preparation 
 
